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I.

INTRODUCTION

T

he security detention policies applied by military forces of the United
States, United Kingdom and other Western countries associated with what
the George W. Bush Administration initially dubbed the “Global War on
 Hersch Lauterpacht Chair in Public International Law, Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Member of the UN Human Rights Committee; Senior Researcher at the Israel
Democracy Institute. The author thanks Professor Amichai Cohen, Professor Sarah
Cleveland and the International Law Studies Board of Editors for their useful comments
on a previous draft. Responsibility for any errors remains with the author. The thoughts
and opinions expressed are those of the author and not necessarily of the U.S. government, the U.S. Department of the Navy or the U.S. Naval War College.
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Terrorism” (GWOT)1 are finding themselves subject to increasing judicial
scrutiny. As a result, some of the legal assumptions that accompanied early
applications of such policies are being reconsidered. For example, the
judgment of the U.S. Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld2 essentially debunked the argument that the GWOT (as pursued against the Taliban, Al
Qaeda and associated forces) and the exercise of detention powers in connection with its execution are regulated by neither international humanitarian law (IHL) rules governing international armed conflict (IAC) nor IHL
rules governing non-international armed conflicts (NIAC).3 Likewise, the
1. The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/wh/6947.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2017). The term
“Global War on Terrorism” (GWOT) is used throughout the article to describe the set of
loosely-connected military operations launched by the United States and some of its allies,
after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, against terrorist groups affiliated with Al
Qaeda, whose members were located in several predominantly Muslim states, including
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen and Somalia.
2. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
3. A full doctrinal analysis of the many classification issues and geographical nuances
of the GWOT exceeds the scope of the present article. It is safe to state, however, that it
appears that many detainees involved in recent conflicts would not qualify as prisoners of
war (POWs) under IAC, since they do not qualify as either “Members of the Armed Forces of a party” or members of other militias “belonging to a Party to the conflict”—
typically understood as a belligerent State. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 54–55 (3d ed. 2016). Many
detainees also fail to meet the substantive criteria for POW status enumerated in the Third
Geneva Convention, including the use of a fixed distinctive sign and a respect for the laws
and customs of war in the conduct of their operations. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]. Nor would such individuals qualify as protected persons
under the Fourth Geneva Convention, entitled to Section IV safeguards, since this status
depends on inter-State belligerency (and, in any event, many of the detention-related protections associated with this status are only relevant to situations of belligerent occupation). Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War arts.
4, 79–141, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva
Convention].
Furthermore, while the proposition that the GWOT is fought on a global battlefield
is highly controversial, it is safe to assert that there is broad support in the literature for
classifying certain inter-parties interactions comprising the GWOT, such as post-transition
armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, as NIACs in line with the holding of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Hamdan. Jelena Pejic, The Protective Scope of Common Article 3: More than
Meets the Eye, 93 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 186, 196 (2011); Marko
Milanovic & Vidan Hadzi-Vidanovic, A Taxonomy of Armed Conflict, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW: JUS AD BELLUM, JUS IN BELLO, AND JUS POST BELLUM 256, 307–08 (Nigel D. White & Christian Henderson eds.,
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2015 judgment of the UK Court of Appeal in Serdar Mohammed and Others v.
Secretary of State for Defence4 rejected the position that IHL rules governing
NIAC can serve as the basis for prolonged detention without trial of suspected international terrorists. Although some aspects of the judgment
were reversed on appeal by the UK Supreme Court in 2017, the position of
the Court of Appeal on detention under NIAC remains intact.5 Arguably,
the combined effect of the Hamdan and Serdar Mohammad judgments presents a challenge to a “hardline” legal position, in which IHL can serve as
an independent basis for the prolonged detention of “enemy combatants”
until the end of hostilities, outside the four corners of the prisoner of war
(POW) regime applicable in IACs.
The growing acceptance of international human rights law (IHRL) doctrines on the co-applicability of rules of IHL and IHRL in times of armed
conflict and on the extra-territorial application of certain IHRL norms
serves as yet another impetus for re-examining existing policies on security
detention. If IHL cannot serve anymore as an exclusive basis for the detention of international terrorists, then other bodies of law (e.g., national legislation, United Nations Security Council resolutions), may provide the necessary legal basis for such detention. Still, such alternative legal bases may
need to be interpreted in an IHRL-friendly manner, or be read subject to
relevant IHRL provisions. Furthermore, even if IHL continues to govern
certain security detentions, in a world of co-application and extra-territorial
application, IHRL arguably should influence the interpretation and application of IHL, including its provisions on security detentions.
The present article discusses one principal IHRL challenge to detention
without trial of suspected international terrorists—the need to introduce an
upper limit on the duration of security detention in order to render it not
indefinite in length. Although even open-ended security detentions may
2013); Sasha Radin, Global Armed Conflict? The Threshold of Extraterritorial Non-International
Armed Conflicts, 89 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 696, 705–06 (2013). But see DINSTEIN,
supra, at 66. Note that the classification of a specific conflict between a State and a nonState party comprising part of the GWOT as a NIAC for the purpose of regulating the
detention of enemy combatants does not exclude the possibility of the parallel applicability
of IAC rules governing protection of civilians to cross-border operations not consented to
by the relevant territorial State. For a discussion, see Dapo Akande, Classification of Armed
Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF
CONFLICTS 77 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2013).
4. Serdar Mohammed and Others v. Secretary of State for Defence [2015] EWCA
(Civ) 843.
5. Al-Waheed v. Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 2.
104

A Human Rights Perspective to Global Battlefield Detention

Vol. 93

come to an end at some point in time, upon the occurrence of an interruptive event (e.g., the end of active hostilities or a change in risk assessment),
there are three critical elements which justify classifying these security detentions as indefinite in nature. They are: (1) the acute lack of certainty that
the detainee experiences about the overall length of detention; (2) the lack
of control by the detainee over the conditions which would bring the detention to an end; and (3) the practical feasibility of the detention period
being extended indefinitely—perhaps for the entire duration of the detainee’s life.
Following these introductory comments, Part II describes the “hardline” position on GWOT-related detention adopted by the United States in
the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks and followed, with certain variations, by other countries, including the United Kingdom and the
State of Israel. According to this “hardline” position, international terrorism suspects can be deprived of their liberty without trial for the duration
of the armed conflict in which the organizations they are affiliated with
participate, in the same way in which “enemy combatants” can be detained
without trial as POWs for the duration of an IAC. Part III describes judicial and quasi-judicial challenges to the “hardline” position: the Hamdan
and Serdar Mohammad judgments in the United States and the UK, the A v.
Secretary of Defence judgment of the Israeli Supreme Court, the Al-Jedda and
Hassan judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), and
the non-binding recommendations of the Human Rights Committee
(HRC) codified in its General Comment 35. Part IV addresses recent developments in IHRL relating to the co-application of the IHL and IHRL
and the extra-territoriality of certain IHRL norms. It specifically discusses
developments relating to the application of IHRL norms governing security detentions. Finally, Part V concludes by offering an IHRL-based perspective to the GWOT-related detention policy and, in particular, to aspects of the policy leading to the de facto placement of international terrorism suspects under a regime of indefinite detention.
II.

THE “HARDLINE” POSITION

In the aftermath of 9/11, the United States assumed custody of thousands
of individuals suspected of participating in hostilities against the United
States as members or accomplices of the Taliban, Al Qaeda and associated
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forces.6 Some of them were detained in Guantanamo Bay; others were kept
in overseas military facilities, such as Bagram prison in Afghanistan; and yet
others were detained in transitory places of custody, including military brigs
on the U.S. mainland and on board naval vessels, and “black prison” sites
in a number of locations around the world.7 Under U.S. domestic law, the
authority to detain suspected terrorists implicated in the GWOT without
criminal charges originally emanated from the 2001 Authorization for Use
of Military Force (AUMF),8 as well as from President George W. Bush’s
Military Order of November 13, 2001, authorizing the detention of individuals who are or have been members of Al Qaeda, or were involved in
other international terrorism attacks against the United States, its citizens
and national interests, as well as individuals harboring such terrorists.9
The legal position underlying the power to detain individuals without
criminal charges was confirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 2004
Hamdi judgment, in which the Court accepted the claim that suspected international terrorists qualifying as “enemy combatants”10—including U.S.
citizens—may be detained without trial for the duration of the conflict.
Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice O’Connor opined that:
The AUMF authorizes the President to use “all necessary and appropriate
force” against “nations, organizations, or persons” associated with the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. 115 Stat. 224. There can be no
doubt that individuals who fought against the United States in Afghanistan as part of the Taliban, an organization known to have supported the
6. According to the Costs of War Project, hosted by the Watson Institute for International and Foreign Affairs at Brown University, “The United States government detained
well over 100,000 people for various periods in conjunction with the War on Terror in the
years since 9/11.” Detention, COSTS OF WAR, http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/
social/rights/detention (last visited Mar. 21, 2017).
7. See, e.g., Council of Eur., Comm. on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfers of Detainees Involving Council of Europe Member States: Second Report, Eur. Parl. Doc. 11302 rev. (June 11, 2007) (by Dick Marty).
8. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
See also 50 U.S.C § 1541 (2017).
9. Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain
Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).
10. An enemy combatant was narrowly defined by the U.S. government for the purpose of the Hamdi litigation as an individual who was “part of or supporting forces hostile
to the United States or coalition partners” in Afghanistan and who “engaged in an armed
conflict against the United States” there. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 526 (2004)
(citing Brief for the Respondents 3).
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al Qaeda terrorist network responsible for those attacks, are individuals
Congress sought to target in passing the AUMF. We conclude that detention of individuals falling into the limited category we are considering, for
the duration of the particular conflict in which they were captured, is so
fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the
“necessary and appropriate force” Congress has authorized the President
to use.11

The United States continues to detain individuals on the Guantanamo
Bay Naval Base and in Afghanistan for the duration of “the particular conflict in which they were captured” on the basis of the AUMF, whose authorization to detain “enemy combatants” for the duration of the conflict
was considered by Justice O’Connor to be “based on longstanding law-ofwar principles.”12
A comparable legal framework was introduced in Israel through the
enactment of the 2002 Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, which
authorized the detention without trial of “unlawful combatants,” defined as
individuals taking part directly or indirectly in armed hostilities against the
State of Israel or belonging to an armed force engaged in hostilities against
the State of Israel, who do not qualify for POW status under the Third
Geneva Convention.13 Although the 2002 Law provides that the detention
of “unlawful combatants” would be reviewed by Israeli courts every six
months, so as to ascertain whether or not their release would harm the security of the State or is justified for other reasons,14 Section 7 of the 2002
Law provides that membership in a hostile organization or participation in
the organization’s hostile activities creates a rebuttable presumption of
harm to State security upon release for as long as hostilities continue. The
upshot of this legal construction is that Israeli lawmakers attempted to create a legal framework that would meet relevant local constitutional and international law sensitivities, while facilitating the prolonged (in fact, indefinite) detention of “unlawful combatants” (who, by definition, do not quali11. Id. at 518.
12. Id. at 521. See also THE WHITE HOUSE, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY
FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE UNITED STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED
NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS 28 (2016) (“The United States bases its authority to
detain these individuals on the 2001 AUMF as informed by the law of armed conflict.”).
13. Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762-2002, SH No. 1834 § 2 (Isr.),
reprinted in 32 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 389 (2003) (translation available at
http://www.hamoked.org/files/2011/240_eng.pdf).
14. Id. § 5.
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fy for POW status), for the duration of the armed conflict in which the terrorist organizations with which they are affiliated are involved.15
In the UK, two frameworks for prolonged detention developed in specific legal contexts that are broadly consistent with the “hardline” position.
The first framework is based on domestic immigration law. Between 2001
and 2004, domestic immigration law was employed to indefinitely detain
(without criminal charges) suspected foreign terrorists, who could not be
deported from the UK by virtue of legal or practical considerations (such
as a concern that they would be exposed to torture in the receiving State,
or because of their statelessness). Such detention was authorized by the
Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which contained a process
for certification of suspected foreign terrorists whose presence in the UK
constituted a risk to national security.16 A terrorist was defined under section 21(2) of the 2001 Act as an individual who is “concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of international terrorism,” “a
member of or belongs to an international terrorist group,” or an individual
who “has links with an international terrorist group.” Although it was accompanied by a derogation from IHRL treaties, the 2001 Act did not purport to rely on IHL as a basis for detention, but rather on immigration law,
and on the need to protect national security in times of emergency.17
A second legal framework to justify prolonged detention without trial
of suspected terrorists was employed by UK armed forces overseas, based
on relevant Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq and Afghanistan.
In Iraq, the UK, like other members of the Multi-National Force, relied on
15. See, in particular, id. § 1 (“This Law is intended to regulate the incarceration of
unlawful combatants not entitled to prisoner-of-war status, in a manner conforming with
the obligations of the State of Israel under the provisions of international humanitarian
law.”). See also Draft Bill for Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants (O.R. Draft), 57602000, HH No. 2883, p. 416, (Isr.)(“The Bill is intended to anchor the authority, which is
consistent with IHL, to detain members of hostile forces not qualifying as POW for the
duration of the conflict.”). It should be noted that one impetus for the passage of the 2002
law is a 2000 Supreme Court judgment indicating that Israel’s existing security detention
legislation—the Emergency Powers (Detention) Law 1979—did not authorize groupbased detention, but rather required the State to establish the personal risk emanating
from each detained individual. CrimA 7048/97 Anonymous Persons v. Minister of Defense 54(1) PD 721 (2000) (Isr.), http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/97/480/070/a09/
97070480.a09.pdf.
16. Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, c. 24, § 21.
17. Unlimited immigration detention is also practiced in Australia pursuant to section
189 of the Migration Act 1958 with regard to aliens who are non-deportable, yet nonreleasable (by reason of the security threat they pose to Australia).
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Security Council Resolutions 1511 (2003) and 1546 (2004), authorizing “all
necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq,”18 to justify the security detention regime introduced by the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Memorandum No. 3. This Memorandum invoked, in turn, provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention
on internment (detention without trial for imperative reasons of security,
reviewable every six months).19 Still, according to UK authorities, Security
Council Resolution 1546 and its subsequent extensions implied that the
end of belligerent occupation in Iraq in 2004 did not terminate the authority of Coalition forces to undertake security detentions for prolonged periods of time.20 A similar claim was made by the UK with regard to the effect
of Security Council resolutions, such as Resolution 1386 (2001), authorizing the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan to
“take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate” (i.e., to assist the Afghan
authorities in maintaining security).21
Finally, it should be noted that domestic security detention laws, available in a number of countries confronting armed violence,22 also permit, at
times, prolonged preventive detention without trial for as long as the relevant security threat remains in place. Such preventive detention measures
are, however, subject to periodic reviews in order to ascertain the continued necessity of detention, or to periodic renewal of detention orders. Although not directly related to the post-9/11 GWOT, this type of security
detention is also largely compatible with the “hardline” position to security
detention of suspected international terrorists, as it may facilitate security
detention for an indefinite period of time in conflict situations.
18. S.C. Res. 1511, ¶ 13 (Oct. 16, 2003); S.C. Res. 1546, ¶ 10 (June 8, 2004).
19. Coalition Provisional Authority Memorandum No. 3 (Revised) § 6(4) (June 27,
2004), http://www.refworld.org/docid/469cd1b32.html.
20. See R (on the application of Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence [2007]
UKHL 58, [32] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill) (“[A]lthough the appellant was not detained
during the period of the occupation, both the evidence and the language of UNSCR 1546
(2004) and the later resolutions strongly suggest that the intention was to continue the preexisting security regime and not to change it.”).
21. S.C. Res. 1386 (Dec. 20, 2001). Security Council Resolution 1386 was extended by
numerous Security Council resolutions including S.C. Res. 1510 (Oct. 13, 2003), S.C. Res.
1833 (Sept. 22, 2008), S.C. Res. 1868 (Mar. 23, 2009), S.C. Res. 1890 (Oct. 8, 2009) and
S.C. Res. 2120 (Oct. 10, 2013).
22. See, e.g., Internal Security Act, sec. 8, (Singapore); Internal Security Act 1960 (Act
82), sec. 8 (Malaysia); Law No. 162 of 1958 (Emergency Law), 5 June 1967, art. 3 (Egypt);
Law No. 7 of 1954 (The Crime Prevention Law), 1 Mar. 1954, art. 3 (Jordan).
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JUDICIAL CHALLENGES TO THE “HARDLINE” POSITION

A. Authority to Detain under IHL
The “hardline” position, which is consistent with the proposition that IHL
rules governing the GWOT allow for detention without trial of terrorists
qualifying as “enemy combatants” for the duration of the conflict, has
come under increased judicial and quasi-judicial scrutiny. As a result of this
scrutiny, a more nuanced legal approach to the exercise of security detention powers has emerged.
One important development was the rejection by the U.S. Supreme
Court in the 2006 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld judgment of the claim that the fight
against international terrorism is regulated neither by Common Article 2
nor by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.23 Writing for the
majority, Justice Stevens wrote in Hamdan that all armed conflicts that do
not qualify as international in nature—that is, between two State parties to
the Geneva Conventions—are by necessary implication governed by
Common Article 3 (notwithstanding their cross-border attributes and global reach):
[T]here is at least one provision of the Geneva Conventions that applies
here even if the relevant conflict is not one between signatories. Article 3,
often referred to as Common Article 3 because, like Article 2, it appears
in all four Geneva Conventions, provides that in a “conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a
minimum,” certain provisions protecting “[p]ersons taking no active part
in the hostilities . . . .24

Significantly, the Supreme Court did not reject in Hamdan its previous
decision in Hamdi, according to which “enemy combatants” could be detained without criminal charges for the entire duration of the armed conflict. Still, the decision to treat the GWOT as regulated by Common Article
3, an article governing NIACs, does invite, in turn, the question of whether
IHL rules governing NIACs can provide States with legal authority to indefinitely detain “enemy combatants,” which would allow them to continue
23. See John Yoo, Terrorists Have No Geneva Rights, WALL STREET JOURNAL, (May 26,
2004), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB108552765884721335.
24. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629 (2006).
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to maintain that such detention is based on longstanding law-of-war principles.25 Two recent decisions by the ECtHR and the UK Court of Appeal
appear to answer this latter question in the negative.
In Hassan v. UK (2014), the ECtHR reviewed, inter alia, the authority of
the UK to detain without trial an Iraqi individual suspected of participating
in armed hostilities in territories occupied by the UK in Iraq, and held that
such legal powers were conferred upon the UK forces by relevant provisions governing security detention in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions. It also held that these powers of detention allow the UK to deviate from the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) on the right to liberty only in situations of IAC.26 This implies that
no similar powers of detention exist under IHL rules governing NIACs; or
that, alternatively, detention based on IHL rules applicable in NIACs must
strictly conform to the requirements of the ECHR.
Whereas Hassan v. UK only reviewed implicitly the power of detention
under IHL rules governing NIACs, this question was at the very heart of
the Serdar Mohammed v. Secretary of State for Defence judgment issued in 2015
by the UK Court of Appeal. The case dealt, inter alia, with the question of
whether or not the UK had legal authority to detain without criminal
charges a suspected Taliban militant in Afghanistan for a number of
months. Since the ISAF, in which the UK participated, was not considered
to be an occupying power in Afghanistan in 2010, the UK was barred from
relying on the security detention regime found in the Third and Fourth
Geneva Conventions. The relevant Security Council resolution authorizing
ISAF activities,27 on which the government relied, was narrowly construed
by the Court of Appeal as permitting only very short-term detention (i.e.,
prior to the transfer of terrorist suspects to the Afghan authorities or immediate release), and so the Court was left with the possibility that only
IHL could provide the basis for Serdar Mohammed’s security detention.
After determining that the armed conflict in which the UK was involved in
Afghanistan constituted an “internationalized NIAC”—a NIAC with
cross-border features—and following an elaborate analysis of treaty law,
25. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004).
26. Hassan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 29750/09, ¶ 104 (2014) (Eur. Ct. H.R.),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-146501 (“It can only be in
cases of international armed conflict, where the taking of prisoners and the detention of
civilians who pose a threat to security are accepted features of international humanitarian
law, that Article 5 could be interpreted as permitting the exercise of such broad powers.”).
27. S.C. Res. 1890, ¶ 2 (Oct. 8, 2009).
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customary international law and new developments in the positions of
States on the issue of security detention (such as the Copenhagen Process),28 the Court of Appeal reached the conclusion that no basis for prolonged security detention exists under IHL rules governing NIACs (although it acknowledged that a rule authorizing such detention ought to be
developed in order to provide an alternative to killing enemy combatants
on the battlefield):
[W]e have concluded that in its present stage of development it is not
possible to find authority under international humanitarian law to detain
in an internationalised non-international armed conflict by implication
from the relevant treaty provisions, Common Article 3 and APII. As to
customary international law, despite the interplay of treaty-based sources
of international humanitarian law and customary international law
sources, the possibility that the requirements for the emergence of a customary rule of international law may be less stringent in the case of the
emergence of a customary rule of international humanitarian law, and the
position of the ICRC, we do not consider that it is possible to base authority to detain in a non-international armed conflict on customary international law.29

It should be noted that the UK Supreme Court reversed on appeal the
position of the Court of Appeal on the question of authority to detain pursuant to Security Council resolutions, thus rendering moot the question of
whether or not IHL rules governing NIACs constitute an independent legal basis for detention. Still, those judges that expressed a view on the matter in their decisions (writing for the majority obiter dicta or dissenting) tended to support the views of the Court of Appeal on the lack of a legal basis
under IHL for detention in post-transition Iraq and Afghanistan.30 The upshot of this analysis is that, according to UK courts, IHL rules governing
NIACs do not appear to provide an independent legal basis for security
detentions. Thus, as explained in Part IV below, resort must be made to
other bodies of law, primarily IHRL, in order to determine the legality under international law of such detentions.

28. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
29. Serdar Mohammed and Others v. Secretary of State for Defence [2015] EWCA
(Civ) 843 [251].
30. Al-Waheed v. Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 2, [14] (Lord Sumption SCJ),
[274] (Lord Reed SCJ).
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Doubts as to whether IHL rules governing NIACs provide a legal basis
for the detention without trial of suspected terrorists also manifest themselves in the academic literature.31 Such doubts have not been put to rest by
the inter-State Copenhagen Process Principles and Guidelines, which focused on the treatment of detainees in NIAC, and not on the legal basis for
their detention.32 In any event, there appears to be broad consensus around
the proposition that even if an authority to undertake security detentions
can be derived from IHL rules governing NIACs—e.g., by way of analogy
from the rules governing IACs,33 or by way of a necessary implication from
the authority to kill on the battlefield individuals directly participating in
hostilities—such rules are currently under-developed and do not provide
exhaustive guidance on critical issues such as the precise grounds for detention, the procedural safeguards available and, arguably, the total length of
security detention.34
31. See, e.g., ELS DEBUF, CAPTURED IN WAR: LAWFUL INTERNMENT IN ARMED CON(2013); Gabor Rona, Is There a Way Out of the Non-International Armed Conflict
Detention Dilemma?, 91 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 32, 35 (2015); Ashley S. Deeks, Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict, 40 CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 403, 404–5 (2009); Francoise J. Hampson, Is Human Rights Law of Any Relevance to Military Operations in Afghanistan?, in THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 485, 502–3 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2009) (Vol. 89, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies). But see Jelena Pejic, Procedural Principles and Safeguards for Internment/Administrative Detention in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 87 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 375, 377 (2005); Knut Dörmann, Detention in NonInternational Armed Conflicts, in NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN THE TWENTYFIRST CENTURY 347, 349 (Kenneth Watkin & Andrew J. Norris eds., 2012) (Vol. 88, U.S.
Naval War College International Law Studies); David Tuck, Taking of Hostages, in THE 1949
GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 297, 310 (Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta &
Marco Sassòli eds., 2015); Chatham House & International Committee of the Red Cross,
Expert Meeting on Procedural Safeguards for Security Detention in Non-international Armed Conflict,
91 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 859, 862–64 (2009).
32. The Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations:
Principles and Guidelines (2012), reprinted in 51 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1368
(2012) [hereinafter The Copenhagen Process] (“During The Copenhagen Process meetings
participants—while not seeking to create new legal obligations or authorizations under
international law—confirmed the desire to develop principles to guide the implementation
of the existing obligations with respect to detention in international military operations.”).
33. For a discussion, see Ramin Mahnad, Beyond Process: The Material Framework for Detention and the Particularities of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 2013 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 33 (Terry D. Gill et al. eds., 2014).
34. See, e.g., Jody M. Prescott, Direct Participation in Hostilities and Its Significance for Detention Standards in Non-International Armed Conflicts, in DETENTION OF NON-STATE ACTORS
ENGAGED IN HOSTILITIES: THE FUTURE LAW 65, 65 (Gregory Rose & Bruce Oswald
FLICT 473–77
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B. Authority to Detain under other Legal Sources
To be clear, even if IHL rules governing NIACs cannot serve as an independent basis for security detention, there is nothing in IHL to prevent
States from relying on domestic legislation or on international law sources
other than IHL to justify the lawfulness of such detentions.35 Indeed, as
indicated above, the United States relied on the AUMF as the legal basis
for its security detention policy, Israel on the Unlawful Combatants Law
and the UK on its immigration legislation and United Nations Security
Council resolutions. However, reliance on domestic legislation invites the
application of relevant constitutional and international law standards, most
notably IHRL, which includes a detailed body of norms governing deprivation of liberty by State authorities both in times of peace and during times
of conflict. Furthermore, as explained below, there is support in the practice of national and international legal institutions for the proposition that
IHRL may also govern, or at least influence, the contents of international
law norms authorizing detention of terrorist suspects, including Security
Council resolutions.
So far, judicial review of U.S. security detention policy has focused on
its compatibility with constitutional habeas corpus standards36 and with
Common Article 3 due process standards.37 While the very power to detain,
pronounced in Hamdi as derived from the AUMF and deemed consistent
with the laws of war, still remains intact, it may still be subject to a future
challenge. First, it could be argued that a winding down of U.S. involvement in the armed conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq—as announced by

eds., 2016); Chris Jenks, Detention under the Law of Armed Conflict, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 301, 310 (Rain Liivoja & Tim McCormack eds.,
2016).
35. The only meaningful restriction found in IHL on the power to detain under other
bodies of law appears to derive from customary international law, as reflected in Rule 128
of the ICRC customary law study, which provides that “[p]ersons deprived of their liberty
in relation to a non-international armed conflict must be released as soon as the reasons
for the deprivation of their liberty cease to exist.” 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 451 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005).
36. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
(2006); Boumedienne v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
37. Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557.
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President Obama in his 2013 National Defense University speech38—will
sooner or later invalidate the legality of continued detention under the
AUMF39 (and the related provision on the authority to detain found in the
2012 National Defense Authorization Act),40 or invite a re-evaluation of
the constitutionality of the continued application of security detention legislation.41 Second, with the passage of time, more and more strain is put on
the proposition that the laws of war authorize the detention without trial of
suspected international terrorists until the end of hostilities, even when no
end to the GWOT appears in sight,42 or is contemplated.43 Thus, even if an
analogy could be drawn between some aspects of a classic IAC and the
fight against international terrorism, the extraordinary length of this conflict, which has no parallel in contemporary IACs to which IHL’s rules on
detention of enemy combatants have been applied, stretches the analogy to
its breaking point.44 Indeed, the very possibility that the analogy would
break down led the drafter of the plurality opinion in Hamdi, Justice
O’Connor, to qualify the judgment’s reliance on an IHL principle allowing
detention until the end of the conflict by using the following words:
If the particular circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those
of the conflicts that informed the development of the law of war, that
understanding may unravel, but this is not the situation we face of this
date.45
38. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense University (May 23, 2013) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university).
39. See, e.g., MATTHEW C. WEED, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 2001 AUTHORIZATION
FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE: ISSUES CONCERNING ITS CONTINUED APPLICATION 12–
13 (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43983.pdf; Harold Hongju Koh, Ending the
Forever War: One Year After President Obama’s NDU Speech, JUST SECURITY (May 23, 2014),
https://www.justsecurity.org/10768/harold-koh-forever-war-president-obama-nduspeech/.
40. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, §
1021(b)(2), 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011).
41. See, e.g., Jennifer Daskal & Stephen I. Vladeck, After AUMF, 5 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 115, 146 (2014).
42. For a discussion, see ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE
BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 255–56 (2007).
43. See, e.g., RUPERT SMITH, THE UTILITY OF FORCE: THE ART OF WAR IN THE
MODERN WORLD 291–94 (2005).
44. See BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN
THE AGE OF TERROR 34 (2008).
45. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004).
115

International Law Studies

2017

Significantly, in other jurisdictions where prolonged detention without
trial of suspected international terrorists was resorted to, domestic and international courts applied constitutional and international law standards,
resulting in a restriction of the power to detain, or in the introduction of
temporal limits on the duration of detention. For example, in Israel, the
Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law 2002 came under legal challenge in 2008 in a case involving the security detention of two Gaza-based
Hezbollah operatives. With respect to the authority to detain under IHL,
the Supreme Court of Israel held that the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict constitutes an IAC, governed by the relevant provisions on security detention of
the Fourth Geneva Convention.46 Under such provisions, the power to detain only extends, according to the Court, to individuals whose contribution to the military effort of the terrorist organization to which they belong,
or which they support, is non-negligible or non-marginal in nature, and
who pose an individual risk to national security.47 Furthermore, the Court
noted that the State refrained from relying on the legislative presumption
that regarded unlawful combatants constituting—by virtue of their group
membership or affiliation—a prima facie risk to national security upon release for the duration of the conflict. It consequently held that as long as
the State bases security detention decisions on a case-by-case analysis of
information establishing the individual dangerousness of the detained individuals, there is no need to examine the compatibility of the presumption
of dangerousness found in section 7 with IHL and Israeli constitutional
law.48 This dicta can be understood as indicating a certain uneasiness on the
part of the Court with the membership-based tilt of the 2002 Law, and
doubts as to whether detention on the basis of group affiliation complies
with Israel’s Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty49 and with the internment provisions of the Geneva Conventions.50
Finally, the Supreme Court of Israel held that, as in other security detention contexts, the length of detention under the 2002 Law (which may
be for the entire duration of the conflict) potentially creates a serious problem for the application of the principle of proportionality, notwithstanding
46. CrimA 6659/06 Anonymous v. State of Israel 62(4) PD 329, ¶ 17 (2008).
47. Id., ¶ 21.
48. Id., ¶ 24.
49. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752–1992, SH No. 1391 (Isr.) https://
www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm.
50. See, e.g., Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 3, arts. 41–46, 79–92.
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the fact that security detention is resorted to in a context which the Court
viewed to qualify as an IAC.51 As a result, it introduced a legal requirement
that the longer the period of detention without trial is the heavier the burden on the State to justify the extension of detention orders (judicial reviews under the 2002 Law take place every six months).52
The upshot of this legal analysis has been the assimilation of the 2002
Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law with Israel’s State of Emergency legislation (which allows security detention under certain conditions for
renewable six-month periods)53 and with Fourth Geneva Convention
standards, requiring the State to detain on the basis of an imperative risk to
security posed by the detainee54 that goes beyond mere membership or affiliation with a terrorist or militant organization.55 In practical terms, the
exercise of periodic judicial review by Israeli courts over security detention
cases led to the restriction of the period of detention to less than two years
in the vast majority of security detention cases.56
In the UK, the immigration law framework allowing for the indefinite
detention without trial of non-deportable foreign terrorists was revoked
following judgments by the House of Lords and the ECtHR, which found
it to be discriminatory and disproportionate and thus incompatible with the
ECHR.57 The ECtHR also held in the Al-Jedda case that Security Council
Resolution 1546, the legal basis for the UK’s detention policy in Iraq,
should be read as incorporating relevant IHRL standards, including the
prohibition on arbitrary detention.58 Since nothing in the Resolution explicitly authorized the UK to hold individuals in indefinite detention without
criminal charges, the Court held that the UK’s detention practices in Iraq
51. CrimA 6659/06 Anonymous v. State of Israel 62(4) PD 329, ¶ 46 (2008).
52. Id.
53. Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, 5739–1979, § 33, 89 (1979) (Isr.), http://
www.btselem.org/sites/default/files/1979_emergency_powers_law_detention.pdf.
54. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 3, arts. 42, 78.
55. This outcome is generally compatible with the position of the Israeli Supreme
Court in the Targeted Killing case, which rejected targeting on the basis of mere group affiliation without consideration of the nature of relevant individual’s participation in the hostilities. HCJ 769/02 Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel,
62(1) PD 507 (2006).
56. See, e.g., Statistics on Administrative Detention, B’TSELEM, http://www.btselem.org/
administrative_detention/statistics (last visited Mar. 21, 2017).
57. A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56; A and Others
v. United Kingdom, 2009-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 137 (2009).
58. Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, ¶ 102 (2011) (Eur. Ct. H.R.),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105612.
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violated the ECHR. Although the majority on the UK Supreme Court in
the recent Al-Waheed case deviated from the position of the ECtHR in AlJedda and held that Security Council Resolutions 1723 (2007)(re Iraq) and
1890 (2009)(re Afghanistan) implicitly authorized security detentions, the
Court nonetheless took the view that safeguards against arbitrary detention
found in Article 5 of the ECHR continue to apply mutatis mutandis to detentions based on these Security Council resolutions, effectively reading-in
IHRL standards into the resolutions.59
The upshot of these cases appears to be that whereas States may derive
the authority to resort to security detentions from domestic legislation or
international instruments (such as Security Council resolutions), this power
remains constrained by domestic constitutional principles and IHRL standards, which govern the international legality of domestic norms and inform
the interpretation of international instruments granting detention authority.60 Such IHRL standards include both procedural safeguards (such as access to judicial review) and substantive balancing norms (introducing considerations such as a high threshold of security risk justifying detention and
limits on the overall length of detention).
A recent codification of IHRL standards relevant to the judicial scrutiny of security detentions can be found in paragraph 15 of the UN HRC
General Comment 35 on the Right to Liberty and Security of Person. This
statement codifies the practice of the Committee and reflects the consensus
view of members of the Committee on the interpretation of Article 9 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR):
To the extent that States parties impose security detention (sometimes
known as administrative detention or internment) not in contemplation
of prosecution on a criminal charge, the Committee considers that such
59. Al-Waheed v. Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 2. Lord Reed, writing for the
minority, was, however, of the view that application of the Al-Jedda judgment should have
led the Supreme Court to narrowly construe the Security Council resolution and to insist
upon an explicit authorization for any security detention that goes beyond that recognized
under domestic Afghani law.
60. Cf. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 2136/2012, M.M.M. et al v.
Australia, Comm. No. 2136/2012, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/108/D/2136/2012 (2013); U.N.
Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 2094/2011, F.K.A.G. et al. v. Australia, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/108/D/2094/2011 (2013). In both cases, the Human Rights Committee
found Australia’s practice of detaining asylum seekers for lengthy periods of time without
criminal charges, on the basis of secret evidence suggesting that their release would jeopardize Australian national security, to be in violation of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.
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detention presents severe risks of arbitrary deprivation of liberty. Such
detention would normally amount to arbitrary detention as other effective
measures addressing the threat, including the criminal justice system,
would be available. If, under the most exceptional circumstances, a present, direct and imperative threat is invoked to justify the detention of
persons considered to present such a threat, the burden of proof lies on
States parties to show that the individual poses such a threat and that it
cannot be addressed by alternative measures, and that burden increases
with the length of the detention. States parties also need to show that detention does not last longer than absolutely necessary, that the overall
length of possible detention is limited and that they fully respect the guarantees provided for by article 9 in all cases. Prompt and regular review by
a court or other tribunal possessing the same attributes of independence
and impartiality as the judiciary is a necessary guarantee for those conditions, as is access to independent legal advice, preferably selected by the
detainee, and disclosure to the detainee of, at least, the essence of the evidence on which the decision is taken.61

Most significantly for our purpose, the UN HRC took the position that
to qualify as non-arbitrary, security detentions must be limited in time. This
is because indefinite detention may be regarded as representing a disproportionate response to the security threat posed by the detained individual,
which may even be regarded, due to the mental anguish associated with the
detainees’ lack of certainty about the time and possibility of their release, a
form of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.62 Arguably, as the next Part illustrates, certain standards developed in IHRL to
regulate security detentions may be deviated from, but only through an
overriding legal instrument. For example, the clear language of lex specialis
treaty provisions, such as the legal regime on POW detention found in the

61. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 35: Article 9 (Liberty and Security
of Person), ¶ 9, nn.35–37, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35 (Dec. 16, 2014) [hereinafter General
Comment No. 35].
62. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No. 2233/2013, F.J. et al. v.
Australia, U.N. Doc. CCPR /C/116/D/2233/2013, ¶ 10.6 (2016); U.N. Comm. against
Torture, Concluding Observations on the Third to Fifth Periodic Reports of United States of America, ¶
14, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/3-5 (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Concluding Observations
(United States)] (“the Committee reiterates that indefinite detention constitutes per se a
violation of the Convention”); Towards the Closure of Guantanamo, Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R., OAS/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 20/15, ¶ 93 (June 3, 2015).
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Third Geneva Convention, may authorize detention on the basis of group
affiliation without the need to establish an individualized security risk.63
IV.

THE INCREASED RELEVANCE OF IHRL STANDARDS

In the twenty-one years since the 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,64 the position that IHRL applies in
times of armed conflict has attained growing acceptance.65 Even countries
like the United States and Israel, who initially resisted this approach, seem
to have subsequently accepted it, albeit somewhat grudgingly, in statements
before international bodies or other legal instruments produced by official
State bodies.66 Furthermore, the extra-territorial reach of international instruments prohibiting arbitrary detention, such as the ICCPR and ECHR,
has been confirmed by international law-applying bodies, such as the ICJ, 67
63. Arguably, even the POW regime of the Third Geneva Convention may come under stress were it to apply to prolonged armed conflicts without an end in sight. The discussion of such a contingency exceeds, however, the scope of the present contribution.
64. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
Rep. 226 (July 8).
65. For support, see Larissa van den Herrick & Hellen Duffy, Human Rights Bodies and
International Humanitarian Law: Common but Differentiated Approaches, in TOWARDS CONVERGENCE IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: APPROACHES OF REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS 366, 370 (Carla Buckley, Alice Donald & Philip Leach eds., 2017);
OREN GROSS & FIONUALLA NI-AOLAIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 361–62 (2006).
66. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Fourth Period Report: United States of America, ¶ 506, U.N. Doc.
CCPR /C/USA/4 (May 22, 2012) (“With respect to the application of the Covenant and
the international law of armed conflict (also referred to as international humanitarian law
or ‘IHL’), the United States has not taken the position that the Covenant does not apply
‘in time of war.’ Indeed, a time of war does not suspend the operation of the Covenant to
matters within its scope of application.”); 2 JACOB TURKEL ET AL., THE PUBLIC COMMISSION TO EXAMINE THE MARITIME INCIDENT OF 31 MAY 2010: ISRAEL’S MECHANISMS
FOR EXAMINING AND INVESTIGATING COMPLAINTS AND CLAIMS OF VIOLATIONS OF
THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT ACCORDING TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 69 (2013),
http://www.turkel-committee.gov.il/files/newDoc3/The%20Turkel%20Report%20for%
20website.pdf [hereinafter TURKEL COMMISSION REPORT] (“The Commission is of the
view that certain human rights norms apply to supplement international humanitarian law
rather than the separate normative regime of human rights law replacing international humanitarian law.”).
67. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 111 (July 9) (“In conclusion, the
Court considers that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is applicable
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ECtHR68 and the UN HRC,69 as well as by a number of domestic courts
(who have accepted this approach explicitly or implicitly).70
Still, while there is growing acceptance of the relevance of IHRL for all
armed conflicts, including conflicts comprising the fight against international terrorism, it is also widely accepted that IHL provisions may sometimes deviate from IHRL norms and displace them by virtue of the lex specialis derogat legi generali principle.71 As recently explained by the UN HRC,
this principle applies to the IHRL prohibition against arbitrary detention
(Article 9 of the ICCPR):
While rules of international humanitarian law may be relevant for the
purposes of the interpretation of article 9, both spheres of law are complementary, not mutually exclusive. Security detention authorized and
regulated by and complying with international humanitarian law in principle is not arbitrary.72

in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory.”).
68. Al-Skeini and Others v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, ¶ 132 (2011) (Eur.
Ct. H.R.), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105606
To date, the Court in its case-law has recognised a number of exceptional circumstances
capable of giving rise to the exercise of jurisdiction by a Contracting State outside its own
territorial boundaries. In each case, the question whether exceptional circumstances exist
which require and justify a finding by the Court that the State was exercising jurisdiction
extraterritorially must be determined with reference to the particular facts.

69. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13
(May 26, 2004)
States Parties are required by article 2, paragraph 1, to respect and to ensure the Covenant
rights to all persons who may be within their territory and to all persons subject to their
jurisdiction. This means that a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in
the Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if
not situated within the territory of the State Party.

70. See, e.g., Smith v. Ministry of Defence [2013] UKSC 41, [55] (Lord Hope SCJ)
(UK); HCJ 3239/02 Mar’ab v. IDF Commander in the West Bank 57(2) PD 349, ¶ 27
(2003) (Isr.) (applying Article 9 of the ICCPR to administrative detention in the West
Bank).
71. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
Rep. 226, ¶ 25 (July 8); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 106 (July 9); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J.
Rep. 168, ¶ 216 (Dec. 19).
72. General Comment No. 35, supra note 61, ¶ 64.
121

International Law Studies

2017

Thus, whereas IHL explicitly allows for a prolonged deprivation of liberty, as is the case with regard to the internment of POWs for the duration
of an armed conflict,73 such an authorization may be deemed lex specialis,
rendering the detention of POWs, in principle, non-arbitrary. Still, it appears that the presumption of conformity with IHRL articulated by the
ECtHR in Al-Jedda74 ought to apply here too—namely, that an interpretive
attempt should be made to construe the relevant IHL rules on restricting
the liberty of POWs (e.g., relating to release on parole or promise, or repatriation of the sick and wounded) in accordance with the parallel norms of
IHRL. Furthermore, it is difficult to accept that certain fundamental and
non-derogable IHRL norms, such as the prohibition against cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment, could ever be lawfully stipulated upon,75 implying
the continued application of some IHRL norms to all security detentions in
all types of armed conflicts.76
Where IHL rules do not provide explicitly for a detailed legal regime
for deprivation of liberty in times of hostilities—as is arguably the case
with respect to IHL rules governing NIACs—the lex specialis argument loses much of its force, and there is a greater justification for applying IHRL
norms to regulate the terms and duration of such security detentions.77
This is particularly the case where the IHL arrangements in question do not
contain humanitarian protections and institutional safeguards corresponding at some level to those existing under IHRL.
Support for the proposition that rules governing detention under NIAC do not displace the application of IHRL detention safeguards is found
in the aforementioned Serdar Mohammed case, where the UK Court of Ap73. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 118.
74. Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, ¶ 102 (2011) (Eur. Ct. H.R.),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-105612.
75. See Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 2.2, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention
against Torture] (“No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a
threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked
as a justification of torture.”).
76. UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, DEVELOPMENT, CONCEPT & DOCTRINE CENTRE,
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATION 1–10: CAPTURED PERSONS (CPERS) 1–7 (3rd ed., 2015).
77. Peter Vedel Kessing, Security Detention in UN Peace Operations, in SEARCHING FOR A
‘PRINCIPLE OF HUMANITY’ IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 272, 287 (Kjetil
Mujezinović Larsen, Camilla G. Guldahl Cooper & Gro Nystuen eds., 2013); Gabor Rona,
Views from Mars, Views from Venus: Minding the Gap between What We Say and What We Do on
Terrorism, in THE LONG DECADE: HOW 9/11 CHANGED THE LAW 269, 274 (David Jenkins, Amanda Jacobsen & Anders Henriksen eds., 2014).
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peal explicitly rejected the claim that IHL authorizes security detention in
NIACs and held that such detentions must be justified under other legal
norms and comply with relevant IHRL standards.78 Although the UK Supreme Court reversed certain aspects of the Court of Appeal’s judgment, it
still reached the conclusion that the relevant Security Council resolutions
conferring authority to detain in Iraq and Afghanistan do not contain sufficient safeguards. Thus, the UK was required to specify in legal instruments
governing the conduct of its forces, such as their Standard Operating Instructions, the conditions of detention, and develop adequate institutional
safeguards in order to comply with the requirements of Article 5 of the
ECHR. 79
The proposition that security detentions in NIAC must be IHRLcompatible also finds support in the jurisprudence of international courts
and committees. In the aforementioned Hassan case, the ECtHR accepted
that IHL may stipulate upon Article 5 of the ECHR (which prohibits arbitrary detention, but offers a “closed list” of permissible exceptions not including security detention in times of conflict), even without a formal derogation, but only in situations constituting an IAC. The Court supported its
conclusion by way of allusion to: (1) the practice of ECHR member States
not to derogate from the Convention in situations of IAC (as opposed to
NIACs, where States have derogated from the Convention in the past)—
suggesting that they may have viewed the rigid conditions of Article 5 as
not directly applicable to IACs, but potentially applicable to NIACs; and
(2) the fact that IHL includes in IACs safeguards comparable, at some level, to those found in IHRL, a fact which facilitates the process of interpre78. Serdar Mohammed and Others v. Secretary of State for Defence [2015] EWCA
(Civ) 843, [280–81].
79. Al-Waheed v. Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 2, [67] (Lord Sumption SCJ)
Given that the Security Council Resolutions themselves contain no procedural safeguards,
it is incumbent on Convention states, if they are to comply with article 5, to specify the
conditions on which their armed forces may detain people in the course of an armed conflict and to make adequate means available to detainees to challenge the lawfulness of
their detention under their own law. There is no reason why a Convention state should
not comply with its Convention obligations by adopting a standard at least equivalent to
articles 43 and 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, as those participating in armed conflicts under the auspices of the United Nations commonly do. Provided that the standard
thus adopted is prescribed by law and not simply a matter of discretion, I cannot think
that it matters to which category the armed conflict in question belongs as a matter of international humanitarian law. The essential purpose of article 5, as the court observed at
para 105 of Hassan, is to protect the individual from arbitrariness. This may be achieved
even in a state of armed conflict if there are regular reviews providing ‘sufficient guarantees of impartiality and fair procedure to protect against arbitrariness.’
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tive adjustment of Article 5 to situations of IAC.80 Arguably, the lack of
comparable safeguards in NIAC underscored the Court’s resistance to deviate from the terms of Article 5 in conflict situations not qualifying as
IACs.
A similar position appears to have been adopted by the UN HRC in
paragraph 66 of its General Comment No. 35, where the Committee insinuated that the scope of the power to derogate from the right to liberty in
situations of emergency is broader in IACs than NIACs.81 Thus, without
determining whether or not IHL rules governing NIACs offer an independent legal basis for detention, the UN HRC opined that detention in
such conflicts remains subject to strict legal controls, including limits on its
overall duration.82
In sum, there appears to be support in the case law of national and international legal bodies for the application of IHRL to security detentions
taking place in the context of NIACs. This applies not only to the scope of
the power to detain without trial—i.e., who is detainable and for what period of time—but also to the terms of judicial or administrative review of
decisions to detain83 and to conditions of detention and the manner of
80. Hassan v. United Kingdom, App. No. 29750/09, ¶ 104 (2014) (Eur. Ct. H.R.).
81. General Comment No. 35, supra note 61, ¶66
During international armed conflict, substantive and procedural rules of international humanitarian law remain applicable and limit the ability to derogate, thereby helping to mitigate the risk of arbitrary detention. Outside that context, the requirements of strict necessity and proportionality constrain any derogating measures involving security detention,
which must be limited in duration and accompanied by procedures to prevent arbitrary
application, as explained in paragraph 15 above, including review by a court within the
meaning of paragraph 45 above.

82. Id.
83. See, for example, the reference to periodic review of detention in Articles 43 and
78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which does not appear in any text governing NIAC.
Any protected person who has been interned or placed in assigned residence shall be entitled to have such action reconsidered as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative board designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose. If the internment
or placing in assigned residence is maintained, the court or administrative board shall periodically, and at least twice yearly, give consideration to his or her case, with a view to the
favourable amendment of the initial decision, if circumstances permit.

Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 43 (emphasis added).
Decisions regarding such assigned residence or internment shall be made according to a
regular procedure to be prescribed by the Occupying Power in accordance with the provisions of the present Convention. This procedure shall include the right of appeal for the
parties concerned. Appeals shall be decided with the least possible delay. In the event of
the decision being upheld, it shall be subject to periodical review, if possible every six
months, by a competent body set up by the said Power.

Id., art. 78 (emphasis added).
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treatment of detained individuals, which are specified in IAC but not in
NIAC. In the latter case too, the detailed IHL rules governing treatment of
detainees under IAC—which sometimes provide detainees with more generous protections than those afforded to them under IHRL84—leave only
limited room for the residual application of IHRL, whereas the few rules
governing detention under NIAC allow considerable space for complementary regulation under IHRL.85
The same conclusion—that is, that IHRL standards should govern important aspects of security detentions of international terrorism suspects—
would also be warranted even were we to take the position that the Hamdan
judgment should be read not as classifying the GWOT as a NIAC, but rather as proposing that Common Article 3 provides a “normative floor” applicable to all individuals not protected by other provisions of the Geneva
Convention.86 This is because the limited normative density of the regulatory regime governing security detentions under this alternative construction
would still be too sparse in its contents to displace the application of IHRL
under the lex specialis doctrine and the “comparable safeguards” rationale.
For the sake of completeness, one should also consider whether customary international law pertaining to detentions in NIAC (or to other
forms of detention governed by Common Article 3) has developed specific
84. See, for example, the prohibition in Article 17 of the Third Geneva Convention
on exposure to “any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind,” which affords
POWs a higher level of protection against coercive interrogation than that found in the
Convention against Torture. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 17.
85. Common Article 3 provides a right to humane treatment and non-discrimination
of detainees, requiring, in particular, protection from violence against their life and person,
prohibition against hostage taking and outrages upon personal dignity and certain due
process guarantees. Few additional protections for health, safety and religious interests are
found in Article 5 of Additional Protocol II. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international
Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
86. GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR: A
MILITARY PERSPECTIVE 125–26 (2d ed. 2015) (citing, inter alia, in support DoD Directive
2310.01E). Matthew C. Waxman, The Law of Armed Conflict and Detention Operations in Afghanistan, in THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN: A LEGAL ANALYSIS, supra note 31, at 343, 346–
47. See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 218 (June 27)
Article 3 which is common to all four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 defines
certain rules to be applied in the armed conflicts of a non-international character. There is
no doubt that, in the event of international armed conflicts, these rules also constitute a
minimum yardstick, in addition to the more elaborate rules which are also to apply to international conflicts.
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rules that deviate from, and which could potentially displace, the relevant
IHRL provisions. It is notable in this regard that the ICRC Customary Law
Study identified several important developments in State practice which
transpose legal standards originally developed in IACs to NIACs, and extend to all NIACs certain standards articulated in the Second Additional
Protocol (with respect to a specific sub-category of NIACs involving control of territory by a non-State group).87 Significantly, unlike some of the
International Committee of the Red Cross customary law study rules which
have been challenged by States,88 it does not appear that any of the standards relating to detention in NIAC have been subject to any real controversy; to the contrary, many of these standards have also been endorsed by the
non-binding Copenhagen Process Principles and Guidelines, which are
likely to result in a further consolidation of the relevant State practice.89
Of particular relevance to the present discussion is Rule 128 of the
ICRC Customary Law Study, which provides:
A. Prisoners of war must be released and repatriated without delay after
the cessation of active hostilities. [IAC] B. Civilian internees must be released as soon as the reasons which necessitated internment no longer exist, but at the latest as soon as possible after the close of active hostilities.
[IAC] C. Persons deprived of their liberty in relation to a noninternational armed conflict must be released as soon as the reasons for
the deprivation of their liberty cease to exist. [NIAC] The persons referred to may continue to be deprived of their liberty if penal proceedings
are pending against them or if they are serving a sentence lawfully imposed.90

This Rule certainly supports the proposition that detention without trial
of suspected terrorists which is not justified by military necessity is unlaw87. For a list of the customary IHL rules applicable to persons deprived of their liberty, see Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INTERNATIONAL
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS (2005) 175, 198 (including prohibitions on corporal punishment, use of human shields, enforced disappearances, collective punishment and sexual
attacks, and requirements for segregation of minors from adults and women from men in
places of detention and for contact of detainees with the outside world).
88. See e.g., John B. Bellinger, III & William J. Haynes II, A US Government Response to
the International Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law,
89 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 443 (2007).
89. See The Copenhagen Process, supra note 32.
90. 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra note 35, at 451.
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ful under customary IHL. It would be difficult, however, to construe this
“thin” rule in a manner that would displace all other relevant IHRL standards on arbitrary detention, including the prohibition against indefinite detention without trial.91 To the contrary, the application of the Al-Jedda presumption against the intent of international lawmakers to displace IHRL,
the doubts expressed in the Serdar Mohammed case as to whether IHL rules
governing NIACs provide a proper legal authority to detain and the international criticism directed against indefinite detention arrangements practiced in connection with the GWOT, should lead us to construe Rule 128
narrowly, leaving intact the application of basic IHRL principles, including
the principle that no indefinite security detention should be allowed.
Since security detentions undertaken in the context of the GWOT do
not, mostly, lend themselves to the application of IHL rules governing
IACs, and since no other regulatory framework explicitly authorizing indefinite detention can be found under IHL treaties or customary IHL, there is
nothing in IHL which can stipulate upon the relevant and applicable rules
of IHRL governing the length of security detentions. Hence, the prohibition against arbitrary detention, which, according to the UN HRC, includes
a requirement that “the overall length of possible detention is limited” 92—
i.e., not be indefinite in length—continues to apply to the GWOT, even in
emergency situations. Furthermore, there is support in international jurisprudence93 for the proposition that indefinite detention without trial could
constitute a form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
banned in all circumstances—including in circumstances related to the
GWOT—by Article 7 of the ICCPR and Article 16 of the Convention
against Torture.94

91. Note, however, the position of the UK Supreme Court, which considered that the
“normative density” of a specific detention regime, for the purpose of determining its
compatibility with the ECHR, may be constituted cumulatively of national and international norms and regulations. Al-Waheed v. Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 2, [67]
(Lord Sumption SCJ).
92. General Comment No. 35, supra note 61, ¶ 15.
93. See Concluding Observations (United States), supra note 62, ¶ 14; U.N. Comm. against
Torture, Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of Israel, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/ISR/CO/5 (2015); U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the
Universal Periodic Review: United States of America, ¶¶ 176.240–176.250, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/30/12 (2015).
94. Convention against Torture, supra note 75.
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V.

CONCLUSION

The starting point for any discussion of the legality of detention without
trial of suspected international terrorists for the duration of the GWOT is
that such detention constitutes an anathema to basic IHRL principles,
which find expression in Article 9 of the ICCPR and Article 5 of the
ECHR, prohibiting arbitrary detention. Although the prohibition on arbitrary detention is not absolute, and can be derogated from or stipulated
upon in times of armed conflict by principles of IHL, which constitute lex
specialis, the latter legal move is increasingly viewed as dependent on the
notion of “comparable safeguards”—that is, on whether the relevant IHL
rules offer certain substantive and procedural protections against excess in
the application of detention powers. It appears, in this regard, that there is
a general acceptance in legal doctrine of the ability of States to rely on the
provisions of the Third Geneva Convention on internment of POWs to
deviate from the parallel IHRL norms. This is because the Third Geneva
Convention provides a detailed regime of POW internment, regulating the
beginning and end of detention, the conditions of detention and presenting
certain concrete options for early release (including immediate release upon
cessation of active hostilities even in the absence of prisoner exchange
agreement,95 and release due to health reasons).96 Furthermore, in practical
terms, given the short duration of active hostilities in the vast majority of
IACs and the availability of prisoner exchange arrangements (“cartels”)
even during active hostilities,97 it would be highly unlikely for a POW in an
IAC to languish for years upon years in detention without trial. Thus, “indefinite detention” in IAC is almost never truly indefinite.
Almost none of these legal and practical safeguards are available in the
fight against international terrorism. The rules governing security detention,
either under NIAC or under Common Article 3 applicable as a “normative
minimum,” are few and far between, and they do not provide a clear roadmap for early release—a point underscored by the difficult “legacy prob-

95. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 118.
96. Id., arts. 109–10. The Convention also affords some less practical release options
(release on parole or promise). Id., art. 21.
97. Robert Frau, Cartels, in THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AND THE USE OF FORCE:
THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 173, 174 (Frauke
Lachenman & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2017).
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lem” of dozens of detainees in Guantanamo.98 Nor do these rules allow for
clear criteria for identifying detainable individuals. It is here that the analogy between IAC and NIAC unravels and, as predicted by Justice
O’Connor,99 where reliance on a general and non-explicit power to detain
individuals under the laws of war for the duration of an endless conflict
becomes legally non-available.
This insight about the limited pull of the lex specialis argument has already caused certain jurisdictions to bring their security detention legislation under constitutional review and led the ECtHR and UN HRC to apply
IHRL norms as a limit on the power to hold individuals in indefinite detention without criminal charges in situations not qualifying as IAC.100 Significantly, the UN HRC held that even in times of emergency, security detentions must meet “requirements of strict necessity and proportionality” that
“constrain any derogating measures involving security detention;”101 there
must also be a showing that the “detention does not last longer than absolutely necessary,” and that “the overall length of possible detention is limited.”102 In fact, indefinite detention without trial might not only be regarded as arbitrary in nature; it may very well also constitute a form of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment—a prohibition that can
never be derogated from.103
IHL rules governing NIACs, which contain few if any rules regulating
detention without trial that offer comparable safeguards to those present
under IHRL, cannot displace these fundamental and specific IHRL standards—whether or not one can base on them an independent power to detain. In fact, it looks as if it is the very paucity of safeguards comparable to
those found under IACs and under IHRL that explains the reluctance of
national and international law-applying institutions to regard IHL rules
governing NIACs as an independent basis for the exercise of security detention powers.
In all events, the logic of co-application of IHL and IHRL invites interpretative interaction between the two bodies of law, resulting in the con98. See Norman Abrams, Addressing the Guantanamo ‘Legacy Problem’: Bringing Law-of-War
Prolonged Military Detention and Criminal Prosecution into Closer Alignment, 7 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY 527, 530 (2014).
99. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004).
100. See supra Part IV.
101. General Comment No. 35, supra note 61, ¶ 66.
102. Id., ¶ 15.
103. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; Convention against Torture, supra note 75, art. 2(2).
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struction of the terms of one body of law in light of those of the other, and
in reading-in provisions of one body of law into the other (unless such
read-ins are excluded explicitly or implicitly, by the very nature of the legal
regime in question). Such an approach has led the ECtHR to construe Security Council resolutions as IHRL-compatible104 and an Israeli Commission of Inquiry to read-in IHRL standards into IHL provisions on investigation of war crime allegations.105 The application of this latter approach to
GWOT-detentions should imply the need to construe the power to engage
in security detention as limited by IHRL principles of necessity and proportionality, including limits on the overall duration of detention without trial.106
Ultimately, both IHL and IHRL norms applicable to armed conflicts
reflect an attempt to strike a balance between security needs and humanitarian interests. Such a balancing act sometimes requires States to assume
certain reasonable security risks in order to avoid excessive harm to fundamental human rights of affected individuals. A regime of indefinite detention deviates from this balancing formula because it involves a drastic
right-limiting measure applied against individuals who pose a security risk
that is, almost inevitably, speculative in nature, and which is often based on
information that these individuals had no fair chance to refute.107 As a result, suspected, yet not convicted, international terrorists may find themselves detained for periods of time as long, if not longer, than those imposed upon criminals convicted for committing serious violent crimes or
for aiding and abetting them (note that such criminals are released at the

104. Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08 (2011) (Eur. Ct. H.R.). Even
the Al-Waheed judgment of the UK Supreme Court supports the proposition that IHRL
safeguards attach to detentions based on a Security Council resolution. Al-Waheed v. Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 2, [67] (Lord Sumption SCJ).
105. See TURKEL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 66.
106. Arguably, the same should hold true for security detentions under the Fourth
Geneva Convention: The power to detain individuals for imperative reasons of security
cannot be exercised in a manner which would be disproportionate to the security risk
posed by the detainee, or that would amount to exposing him or her to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment. An upper time limit for the maximum period of detention could
minimize the risk of violation of proportionality requirements, and would address some of
the harshness associated with the uncertainty of detention without trial for an indefinite
period of time.
107. See, e.g., KENT ROACH, Managing Secrecy and its Migration in a Post-9/11 World, in
SECRECY, NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE VINDICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 115,
118 (David Cole, Federico Fabbrini & Arianna Vedaschi eds., 2013).
130

A Human Rights Perspective to Global Battlefield Detention

Vol. 93

end of their sentence although they may continue to pose a threat to public
safety due to the risk of recidivism).
Finally, as indicated above, the lack of an overall limit on the period of
security detention constitutes a particularly harsh measure, turning what may
be a proportionate reaction to a security threat into a disproportionate one,
possibly constituting a form of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.
Consequently, transforming indefinite security detentions into time-limited
ones, opting for predictable and reasonable time frames for detention, is the
morally right and legally correct thing to do.
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